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Abstract
We document a large decrease in earnings inequality in Brazil between 1996 and 2012. Us-
ing administrative linked employer-employee data, we fit high-dimensional worker and firm
fixed effects models to understand the sources of this decrease. Firm effects account for 40 per-
cent of the total decrease and worker effects for 29 percent. Changes in observable worker and
firm characteristics contributed little to these trends. Instead, the decrease is primarily due to
a compression of returns to these characteristics, particularly a declining firm productivity pay
premium. Our results shed light on potential drivers of earnings inequality dynamics.
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1 Introduction
Since the mid-1990s, Brazil has experienced a large reduction in earnings inequality resembling
the experience of other Latin American economies during this period. This decrease in earnings
inequality stands in stark contrast to that of the US and many developed countries, which saw
inequality steadily increasing over the past two decades.1 This paper studies the sources of this
decrease.
To this end, we exploit a large administrative linked employer-employee dataset containing
information on hundreds of millions of job spells between 1988 and 2012. By repeatedly esti-
mating an additive worker and firm fixed effects model due to Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis
(1999a)—henceforth AKM—we quantify the contributions of firm and worker-specific factors to-
wards changes in Brazilian inequality. In a second stage, we link this earnings decomposition
to a rich set of worker demographics and firm financials data for Brazilian manufacturing and
mining firms. The merged data allow us to study the transmission from worker and firm char-
acteristics into pay in a large developing economy. In doing so, we distinguish between changes
in the distribution of worker and firm characteristics on one hand and changing returns to these
characteristics on the other hand.
We uncover threemain results. First, firms played an important role in the decrease in earnings
inequality in Brazil over this period, explaining 40 percent of the fall in the variance of log earnings
between 1996 and 2012. Compression in worker fixed effects explains an additional 29 percent of
the decrease, with the remaining part attributable to a decrease in the covariance between worker
and firm fixed effects and the residual. Given that worker heterogeneity is the most important
component in explaining pay levels throughout this period, the compression in firm-specific pay
contributed more than proportionately towards Brazil’s inequality decrease.
Second, changes in the link between firm performance and pay account for a significant frac-
tion of the compression in the firm component of workers’ earnings.2 We first show that a substan-
tial share of the cross-sectional variation in the firm component of pay is explained by differences
in observable firm characteristics, with more productive and larger firms paying more. Moreover,
1See Lopez and Perry (2008) and Tsounta and Osueke (2014) for inequality trends in Brazil and the rest of Latin
America. Kopczuk et al. (2010) and Heathcote et al. (2010) document the evolution of earnings inequality in the US,
while Atkinson and Bourguignon, eds (2015) discuss inequality trends across other high- andmiddle-income countries.
2This part of the analysis is based on the subpopulation of larger mining and manufacturing firms for which we
have data. As we discuss in greater detail later, this subpopulation has experienced both a similar amount of overall
compression in earnings inequality and a similar contribution of workers and firms towards it.
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more than half of the decrease in the firm component is accounted for by observable firm char-
acteristics. All of this decrease is driven by a weakening pass-through from firm characteristics
to pay, while none is due to firms becoming more similar in observable characteristics over time.
Altogether, a weaker link between observable firm characteristics and worker pay explains 30
percent of the overall fall in the variance of log earnings over this period.
Third, a decrease in the return to measures of ability such as experience and education explains
a sizable share of the fall in the variance of the worker component of pay. In levels, age and
education explain close to 40 percent of the variance of the worker component of pay. However,
we do not observe a large compression in the underlying distributions of such characteristics over
time. Instead, the decrease in worker pay heterogeneity is driven by a rapid fall in the returns
to observable measures of worker ability, particularly the education premia. Lower returns to
worker age and education explain 14 percent of the overall fall in the variance of log earnings
over the 1996–2012 period.
This decomposition of the sources of Brazil’s earnings inequality decrease informs our un-
derstanding of various commonly proposed explanations of the decrease. On the worker side,
our results do not support an often articulated view that changes in educational attainment ac-
counted for the largest share of Brazil’s inequality evolution over the period (Barros et al., 2010).
While educational attainment increased rapidly over this period, those gains were largely offset
by concurrent decreases in the high school and college education premia. We reach similar con-
clusions regarding the implications of changes in the age structure of the workforce. On the firm
side, a reading of the existing literature would suggest that trade and other factors affecting the
productivity distribution during this period could have been an important driver behind changes
to the earnings distribution.3 Yet, in line with US trends, we find that the Brazilian productivity
distribution actually grew more dispersed over this period.
These findings pose a challenge to candidate explanations behind Brazil’s decrease in earnings
inequality over this period. Our results suggest that a theory of the inequality decrease needs to be
consistent with the following three facts: (i) firm-level pay differences explain a significant share
of initial inequality levels and a disproportionately large share of its decrease; (ii) lower pass-
through from firm productivity to pay is a key driver behind compression in the firm component
3See for example Dunne et al. (2004) and Faggio et al. (2010) who conclude that parts of the increase in earnings
inequality in the US can be explained by widening dispersion in the firm productivity distribution.
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of pay; and (iii) lower returns to worker ability explain a significant share of the compression
in the worker component of pay. We conclude that changes in pay policies rather than shifts in
the distribution of worker and firm fundamentals played an important role in Brazil’s inequality
decrease during this period.
Related literature. We contribute to three broad strands of the literature. First, we provide a
decomposition of earnings into worker and firm heterogeneity in a developing economy. With the
increasing availability of large, administrative matched employer-employee datasets, a growing
literature examines the role of firms in wage determination. A seminal methodological contribu-
tion that separately identifies worker and firm heterogeneity in pay is thework byAKM. They find
an important role for firms in explaining observed wage dispersion in French linked employer-
employee data. Similar conclusions have been reached among others for Germany (Andrews et
al., 2008; Card et al., 2013), Italy (Iranzo et al., 2008), Portugal (Card et al., 2016), Brazil (Lopes de
Melo, 2015), Sweden (Bonhomme et al., 2016), Denmark (Bagger and Lentz, 2016), and the United
States (Abowd et al., 1999b, 2002; Woodcock, 2015; Sorkin, 2015; Engbom andMoser, 2017b). Some
recent papers are closely related to the first stage of our empirical methodology, which applies
the AKM framework in overlapping subperiods to study changes in earnings components over
time. Card et al. (2013) find that increasing dispersion in the firm-specific component of pay con-
tributed significantly to rising earnings inequality in West Germany. Barth et al. (2016) and Song
et al. (2016) show that firms were an important driver behind the increase in US labor earnings
inequality since 1980, with the latter set of authors highlighting an increased assortativeness in the
allocation of workers across firms through the lens of the AKM framework.
Second, we contribute to a literature studying worker pay in relation to firm outcomes by
linking our decomposition results to worker and firm characteristics. In previous work, Blanch-
flower et al. (1996) suggest and implement a test for rent-sharing in the US manufacturing sector.
Van Reenen (1996) examines pass-through from firm-level innovation to worker wages in the UK.
Guiso et al. (2005) assess to what extent firm-level productivity shocks are passed on to workers
in Italy. AKM study the link between measures of firm performance and estimated firm effects
in France, but do not focus on changes over time to this relationship. Similarly, Menezes-Filho
et al. (2008) focus on the cross-sectional relationship between firm characteristics and wages in
Brazil’s manufacturing and mining sectors. Card et al. (2014) focus on the relationship between
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rent-sharing and firm investments in Italy. Bagger et al. (2014) investigate the role of labor misal-
location in driving the positive correlation between labor productivity and firm-level wages using
Danish data. Card et al. (2016) analyze the degree of rent-sharing in Portugal with a particular
emphasis on gender differences in profit participation and the allocation of workers across firms.
By differentiating between changes in the underlying distribution versus changes in the returns
to worker and firm characteristics over time, we contribute toward this literature and shed light
on the sources behind Brazil’s large decrease in earnings inequality.
Third, we add to the literature on the drivers of inequality dynamics in Brazil by providing
a comprehensive decomposition of its inequality evolution that cuts across specific explanations.
Many previous papers have studied the role of isolatedmechanisms in Brazil’s inequality decrease
over the last two decades. For example, Ulyssea (2014) andMeghir et al. (2015) study the effects of
policies on Brazil’s formal and informal sector employment. Alvarez (2017) interprets empirical
worker switches between sectors through the lens of a Roy model to investigate determinants
of the agricultural wage gap in Brazil. Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2017) analyze the long-lasting
impact of industry-specific tariff cuts in the presence of imperfect interregional labor dynamics
related to slow capital adjustment and agglomeration economies. In related work, Dix-Carneiro
et al. (2016) relate Brazil’s trade liberalization to income inequality and crime at the regional level,
while Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2015) examine its impact on the evolution of the skill premium.
Helpman et al. (2016) show that a significant share of the rise in Brazilian wage inequality from
1986–1995 is due to between-firm differences and that these trends are consistent with the effects
of trade liberalization in a heterogenous-firmmodel of trade and inequality. Adão (2016) finds that
movements in world commodity prices explain part of the decrease in Brazilian wage inequality
from 1991–2010. Medeiros et al. (2014) use administrative tax return data to study the evolution
of top income inequality in Brazil from 2006–2012, but they cannot distinguish between the role
played by worker versus firm characteristics during that period. Using a empirical methodology
similar to ours, Lopes deMelo (2015) conducts a static decomposition of earnings inequality levels
in Brazil’s formal sector into components due to firms and workers. de Araujo (2014) studies the
role of labor adjustment costs in propagating wage inequality in the Brazilian context. Finally,
using administrative linked employer-employee data and an equilibrium search model, Engbom
and Moser (2017a) argue that the rise in the minimum wage was an important driver behind
Brazil’s inequality decrease from 1996–2012.
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Outline. The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the
main institutional changes and macroeconomic trends affecting Brazilian labor markets from 1988
to 2012. Section 3 summarizes the administrative datasets used in our empirical analysis and dis-
cusses sample selection as well as variable definitions. Section 4 provides descriptive statistics on
trends in earnings inequality in Brazil during this period. Section 5 introduces our two-stage em-
pirical framework, which first decomposes earnings into worker and firm components and then
links this decomposition to worker and firm characteristics. Section 6 describes our main empiri-
cal results, presents checks on the validity of our empirical framework, and discusses implications
for potential explanations behind Brazil’s inequality decrease. Finally, Section 7 summarizes our
key findings and concludes.
2 Institutions and macroeconomic trends in Brazil
During our period of study, Brazil resumed democratic elections in 1989, ended a decade of hyper-
inflation in 1994, and recovered from a financial crisis in 1999. The latter came with a floating of
the exchange rate and fiscal adjustment, which resulted in the government turning a deficit into a
primary surplus. After a "lost decade" of economic growth leading up to 1994, real GDP per capita
grew by a half percentage point a year up until 2002, by a rapid three percent per year 2002–2008,
contracted by two percent in 2009, and rebounded quickly with six percent growth in 2010. In this
section, we discuss some of the institutional changes that could have affected inequality during
this period, including labor regulation, trade liberalization and social policy.
Brazil had a highly regulated labor market before reforms started in the late 1980s. Since 1965
a national Wage Adjustment Lawmandated yearly wage increases for all workers in the economy
and dismissal costs were high. After the transition to civil rule and the signing of a new constitu-
tion in 1988, flexibility in labor markets was further affected by firing penalties and the increasing
power of labor unions, which gather about a quarter of employed formal workers in Brazil. The
Wage Adjustment Law was finally abandoned in 1995, introducing a period of greater flexibility
and less regulated wage-setting practices. Further legislation in 1997–1998 eased restrictions on
temporary contracts and lowered dismissal barriers. Subsequently, formal employment increased
by around five percent and unemployment fell from 10 percent in 2000 to around six percent in
2011. The overall labor force participation rate has remained roughly stable at 65–70 percent over
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this period (World Bank, 2016).
Hyperinflation resulted in widespread indexation of wages to the minimum wage. From 1980
to 1989, yearly inflation averaged 355 percent, which was followed by a yearly average of 1,667
percent between 1990 and 1994 (World Bank, 2016). To keep up, the minimum wage was adjusted
first annually and then on a monthly basis proportionately to the previous period’s realized in-
flation rate. In 1994, hyperinflation finally subsided with the introduction of the Plano Real. This
ambitious stabilization program introduced a gradual float of the local currency, tightened mone-
tary and fiscal policy, and lowered inflation below two-digits.
In parallel to monetary stabilization, Brazil liberalized trade during this period. Starting with
initially high import tariffs that had substituted import bans from the previous decade, a series
of trade liberalization bills in the late 1980s eliminated selected tariffs and eradicated quantitative
import controls. Upon becoming president in 1995, social democrat Fernando Henrique Cardoso
further strengthened this agendawith a reduction of tariff and non-tariff trade barriers to one tenth
of their levels in 1987 (Pavcnik et al., 2004). The opening up to trade over the last 25 years has been
frequently cited as amajor contributor to the country’s growth in total factor productivity (Ferreira
and Rossi, 2003; Ferreira et al., 2007; Moreira, 2004; Muendler, 2004; Córdova and Moreira, 2003).
In addition, Helpman et al. (2016) argue that trade reforms contributed to the rise in earnings
inequality in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Health, education and other social programs began expanding during the late 1990s. This
trend further strengthened with the election of the left-wing Workers’ Party in 2003, who doubled
social expenditure as a fraction of GDP. Although social spending remains less than one percent
of GDP, it is often portrayed as an important contributor to the reduction in household income
inequality.4 The reach of the public cash transfer program, Bolsa Famìlia, increased to cover 11
million families in 2006, which comprised nearly 25 percent of the total population (Barros et al.,
2010). Education spending increased to 5.5 percent of GDP in 2009 (compared to 3.5 percent in
2000 and 5.7 percent among G20). As we discuss in Appendix A, this is reflected in a rapidly
rising share of the labor force with a high school degree. Moreover, the quality of education
relative to other countries, as measured by the international PISA scores, has also improved, with
Brazil having the greatest increase in mathematics among 65 countries since 2003 (Organisation
4Using household data, Barros et al. (2010) estimate that social programs accounted for about 20 percent of the
decrease in household income inequality.
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for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2012).
The Worker’s Party complemented social policies with accelerated minimum wage increases.
Within their first year in office, they implemented a 20 percent increase of the minimum wage in
2003 and continued to implement yearly increases averaging over 10 percent during the next 10
years. As a result, the minimum to median earnings of adult male workers in Brazil increased
from around 34 percent in 1996—similar to US levels—to over 60 percent, which is close to the
level in France. Engbom and Moser (2017a) argue that this large increase in the minimum wage
can explain a significant fraction of the reduction in earnings inequality in Brazil over the 1996–
2012 period, while being consistent with the key facts in this paper.
3 Data
Our analysis uses two confidential administrative datasets from Brazil: the Relação Anual de In-
formações Sociais (RAIS) contains earnings and demographic characteristics of workers as reported
by employers, and the Pesquisa Industrial Anual - Empresa (PIA-Empresa, or PIA in short) contains
detailed information on revenues and costs of firms in Brazil’s mining and manufacturing sectors.
In the following section, we briefly discuss their collection, coverage, variable definitions, and
sample selection.
3.1 Linked employer-employee data (RAIS)
Collection and coverage. The RAIS data contains linked employer-employee records that are
constructed from a mandatory survey filled annually by all registered firms in Brazil and admin-
istered by the Brazilian Ministry of Labor and Employment (Ministerio do Trabalho e Emprego, or
MTE). Data collection was initiated in 1986 within a broad set of regions, reaching complete cover-
age of all employees at formal establishments of the Brazilian economy in 1994.5 Fines are levied
on late, incomplete, or inaccurate reports, and as a result many businesses hire a specialized ac-
countant to help with the completion of the survey. In addition, MTE conducts frequent checks on
5Because registration with the central tax authorities is necessary for a firm to be surveyed, the RAIS covers only
workers in Brazil’s formal sector. Complementing our analysis with data from the Brazilian household survey Pesquisa
Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios (PNAD), we find that the formal sector employment share amongmale workers of age
18–49 grew from 64 to 74 percent between 1996 and 2012. Differential inequality trends between formal and informal
sector workers are discussed at more length in Engbom and Moser (2017a).
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establishments across the country to verify the accuracy of information reported in RAIS, particu-
larly with regards to earnings, which are checked to adhere to the minimum wage legislation.6
The RAIS contains an anonymized, time-invariant person identifier for each worker, which al-
lows us to follow individuals over time. It also contains anonymized time-invariant establishment
and firm identifiers that we use to link multiple workers to their employers and follow those over
time. Although it would be possible to conduct part of our analysis at the establishment instead
of firm level, this paper focuses on firms for three reasons. First, to the extent that there is substan-
tial variation in pay across establishments within firms, our firm-level analysis provides a lower
bound on the importance of workers’ place of employment.7 Second, we think that many of the
factors that could give rise to employer-specific components of pay, including corporate culture,
company leadership, etc., act at the firm level. Additionally, many regulations targeting pay poli-
cies differ as a function of firm-level employment, not establishment-level employment. Third,
we will later use data on firm characteristics such as financial performance that are not available
at the establishment-level.
Variable definitions. For each firm at which a worker was employed during the year, the RAIS
contains information on the start and end date of the employment relationship, the amount the
worker was paid andworker background characteristics. Reported earnings are gross and include
regular salary payments, holiday bonuses, performance-based and commission bonuses, tips, and
profit-sharing agreements. While this is a broad measure of earnings, it does not contain other
sources of income such as capital income or in-kind transfers. To control for variation in labor
supply, we divide total earnings from an employment relationship in a given year by the duration
of the job spell.8 As weekly hours only exist from 1994, our main analysis does not use per hour
pay. Instead, to limit the impact of unmeasured labor supply differences, we focus on adult males.
In the years for which we have hours, more than 75 percent of adult males report working 44
6In addition to being fined, non-compliant firms are added to a “Black List of Slave Work Employers,” made avail-
able publicly under law Decree No. 540/2004. Current versions of the list are disseminated by the Brazilian television
news channel Repórter Brasil.
7As we will show later, however, the explanatory power of our model incorporating firm and person effects is high,
leaving little variation to be explained by separate establishment level effects. This is in line with evidence from the US
in Barth et al. (2016) and Song et al. (2016) who show that most across firm dispersion drives the vast majority of cross
plant variation.
8That is, if an employment relationship is reported as active for seven months during the year, we divide total
earnings reported for that employment relationship for that year by seven.
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hours a week.9
We define a consistent age variable by calculating the year of birth for any observation, and
then setting an individual’s year of birth as the modal implied value and finally reconstructing
age in each year using this imputed year of birth.10 Because age is only reported in bins prior to
1994, we code all subsequent years into the same age bins: less than 18, 18–24, 25–29, 30–39, 40–49,
and more than 49 years old.
We define a consistent measure of years of schooling by first setting it to its modal value within
a year in case of multiple job spells in a year and then ensuring that the years of schooling are non-
decreasing across years. Subsequently, we define four education groups based on degree comple-
tion implied by the reported number of years of schooling and the education system in Brazil:
primary school (four years), middle school (seven years), high school (12 years), and college (12
or more years).
The data also contain information on detailed occupation classification of the job and detailed
sector classification of the employer establishment. Both the industry and occupation classifica-
tion systems underwent a significant change during the period we study. For occupations, we use
the pre-2003 classification (Classificação Brasileira de Ocupações, or CBO) at the one-digit level. We
also use two-digit sectoral classifications (Classificação Nacional de Atividades Económicas, or CNAE)
according to the pre-2003 period. Wemake occupations and sectors reported for 2003–2012 consis-
tent with the older CBO and CNAE classifications by using conversion tables provided by IBGE.
In order to increase consistency between the old and the new classification schemes we opt for
one digit occupation classification and two digit sector classification, which for the purpose of this
paper we think provides sufficient detail.
Our firm size measure is the number of full-time equivalent workers during the reference
year. We calculate it as the total number of worker-months employed by the firm during the year
divided by 12.11
Sample selection. We exclude observations with either firm or worker identifiers reported as
invalid as well as data points with missing earnings, dates of employment, educational attainment
9We show in Appendix D that similar inequality trends hold in hourly wage rates for full-time employed adult
males for the years for which we have data on hours.
10We use age instead of experience throughout our analysis; results are similar using age plus six minus years of
education as a measure of experience.
11This is computed prior to making any sample restrictions so that it reflects accurately, to the extent possible, the
total amount of labor used by the firm during the year.
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or age. Together, these cleaning procedures drop less than one percent of the original population,
indicative of the high quality of the data. Subsequently, to limit the computational complexity
associated with estimating our model, we restrict attention to one observation per worker-year.
We impose this restriction by choosing the highest-paying among all longest employment spells
in any given year. As the average number of jobs held during the year is 1.2 and there is no trend
in this, we believe that loosening this restriction would not meaningfully affect our results.
Finally, we restrict attention to male workers age 18–49. We make this restriction as a trade-off
between on the one hand our results being comparable to a large part of the literature focusing
on prime age males, and on the other to obtain as complete as possible coverage of changes in the
Brazilian earnings structure over the period. The restriction to male workers has the advantage
of avoiding issues with changing patterns of female labor supply over time. The restriction to
age 49 and below is made to avoid issues related to early retirement, which is more common in
Brazil than in the US and other developed countries. In previous versions of the paper, we have
considered a wider age range as well as both genders, leading to broadly similar findings as what
we present here.
Descriptive statistics. Table 1 provides key summary statistics for the RAIS data for the six sub-
periods that we will later use in our AKM analysis, namely 1988–1992, 1992–1996, 1996–2000,
2000–2004, 2004–2008, and 2008–2012. Since our analysis focuses separately on adult males as well
as adult males working for larger manufacturing and mining firms, we provide a brief compari-
son of these subpopulations to the overall population of formal sector employees. As we will be
primarily concerned with the later four subperiods during which inequality decreased markedly
and for which we have firm level data, we focus our discussion on these periods.
Panel A shows statistics for the overall formal sector work force in Brazil, while Panel B shows
statistics for the subpopulation of prime age adult males. The latter group has 0.67 years of school-
ing less than the overall sample in the 1996–2000 subperiod; this gradually drops to 0.57 years in
the last subperiod. Adult males earn 4–13 log points more than the overall population, and the
variance of log earnings is slightly higher than that of the overall population.
Panel C presents statistics on the subpopulation of adult males working at larger mining and
manufacturing firms. Adult males in the PIA subpopulation are about 0.03 years younger than
all adult males in the 1996–2000 subperiod, which gradually increases to 0.5 years younger in the
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last subperiod. They are similar to all adult males in terms of education. The PIA sample of adult
males earned on average 28 log points more than all adult males in the 1996–2000 subperiod; this
decreased to 20 log points in the last subperiod. Finally, they display a three and five log point
higher standard deviation of log earnings in the 1996–2000 and 2008–2012 period, respectively.
Table 1. RAIS summary statistics
# Worker- Earnings Age Schooling
years # Workers Mean St.d. Mean St.d. Mean St.d.
PANEL A. ALL FORMAL SECTOR WORKERS (RAIS)
1988–1992 165.5 41.3 1.10 0.86 31.90 11.44 7.65 4.43
1992–1996 162.1 43.0 1.18 0.86 33.17 11.29 8.09 4.40
1996–2000 174.6 46.7 1.19 0.84 33.67 11.26 8.61 4.26
2000–2004 202.7 52.6 1.00 0.80 34.01 11.32 9.50 4.05
2004–2008 254.2 62.4 0.81 0.74 34.21 11.45 10.27 3.78
2008–2012 326.5 75.7 0.71 0.71 34.46 11.62 10.81 3.51
PANEL B. ADULT MALE WORKERS
1988–1992 78.4 23.5 1.23 0.86 30.80 8.05 7.17 4.25
1992–1996 78.9 24.3 1.28 0.86 31.42 8.10 7.50 4.20
1996–2000 83.9 26.5 1.26 0.83 31.54 8.17 7.94 4.07
2000–2004 94.7 29.8 1.04 0.78 31.58 8.22 8.81 3.89
2004–2008 112.9 34.0 0.85 0.72 31.65 8.24 9.60 3.67
2008–2012 135.0 39.6 0.76 0.68 31.76 8.21 10.24 3.46
PANEL C. ADULT MALE WORKERS AT LARGE MANUFACTURING AND MINING FIRMS (PIA)
1996–2000 15.5 5.8 1.54 0.86 31.51 8.05 7.95 4.01
2000–2004 16.7 6.3 1.28 0.83 31.30 8.13 8.87 3.84
2004–2008 21.0 7.8 1.07 0.77 31.12 8.14 9.52 3.69
2008–2012 23.9 9.0 0.96 0.73 31.26 8.08 10.16 3.51
Note: The number of worker-years and number of unique workers are reported in millions. Statistics on earnings are in log multiples
of the current monthly minimum wage, schooling is in years, a person’s age is the average age of his age bin. Panel A includes all
workers in the RAIS dataset. Panel B includes male workers that are between 18 and 49 years old. Panel C includes male workers
age 18–49 working at larger manufacturing and mining firms included in the PIA firm characteristics data. Means are computed by
period. The standard deviation is calculated by first demeaning variables by year and then pooling the years within a subperiod.
Source: RAIS.
3.2 Firm characteristics data (PIA)
Collection and coverage. The PIA data contain information on firm financial characteristics
from 1996–2012. The dataset is constructed by the Brazilian National Statistical Institute (Instituto
Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, or IBGE) based on annual firm surveys in the manufacturing
and mining sector. This survey is mandatory for all firms with either more than 30 employees or
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above a revenue threshold as well as for an annual random sample of smaller firms.12 As with
RAIS, completion of the survey is mandatory and non-compliance is subject to a fine by national
authorities. Each firm has a unique, anonymized identifier, which we use to link firm characteris-
tics data from PIA to worker-level outcomes in the RAIS data.
Variable definitions. The PIA dataset includes a breakdown of operational and non-operational
revenues, costs, investment and capital sales, number of employees and payroll. All nominal val-
ues are converted to real values using the CPI index provided by the IBGE. Instead of the measure
of firm size in the PIA, we prefer our measure of full-time-equivalent employees constructed from
the RAIS as it accounts for workers only employed during part of the year. We define operational
costs as the cost of raw materials, intermediate inputs, electricity and other utilities, and net rev-
enues as the gross sales value due to operational and non-operational firm activities net of any
returns, cancellations, and corrected for changes in inventory.13 We construct value added as the
difference between net revenues and intermediate inputs, and value added per worker as value
added divided by full-time equivalent workers. This is our main measure of firm productivity. We
have also constructed several alternative measures of firm productivity by cleaning value added
per worker off industry-year effects and some measures of worker skill, with similar results.
Our productivity measure differs from commonly used total factor productivity (Bartelsman
et al., 2009, 2013) since it does not control for capital intensity. We opt for this measure because
we do not directly observe capital stocks in the PIA data, only investment. To construct a measure
of the capital stock, one would need to assume a depreciation rate to be able to impute capital
using reported investment. In the absence of firm investment data prior to 1996, one would also
need to impute initial capital stocks at the firm-level in 1996, as well as for any firm that (re-)enters
the PIA population. We have constructed such a measure of the capital stock, but the multiple
imputations required to obtain capital and fact that the investment data is incomplete for many
firms lead us to prefer value added per worker as our measure of firm productivity. Instead we
have constructed several variants of this labor productivity measure, making various adjustments
for worker input quality that lead to very similar results to what we present below.14
12The revenue threshold for inclusion in the deterministic survey has grown over the years, standing at USD300,000
in 2012.
13We have explored alternative revenue definitions such as only restricting attention to operational revenues or ex-
cluding certain types of non-operational revenues. Such robustness checks yield very similar results to what we report
below.
14Specifically, in the construction of labor productivity, we alternatively divide value added by the raw number of
13
Sample selection. The PIA firm survey spans the universe of larger firms (as defined above)
in Brazil’s manufacturing and mining sectors in addition to a random sample of smaller firms.
Because parts of our analysis make use of the panel dimension on the firm side and to avoid issues
with excessive sample attrition related to our later estimation procedure, we focus our analysis on
the deterministic set of relatively larger firms.
Table 2. PIA summary statistics
Firm size Value added p.w.
# Firm-years # Unique firms Mean St.d. Mean St.d.
1996–2000 110.5 34.8 6.41 1.74 11.15 1.13
2000–2004 130.6 40.9 6.35 1.79 11.19 1.32
2004–2008 156.5 48.8 6.57 1.90 11.22 1.34
2008–2012 176.8 55.8 6.69 1.98 11.30 1.31
Note: The number of firm-years and number of unique firms are reported in thousands. Firm size is the log number of full-time
equivalent employees. Value added per worker is the log of real value added per worker. Means and standard deviations are weighted
by the number of full-time employees. The standard deviation is calculated by first demeaning variables by year and then pooling the
years within a subperiod. Source: PIA.
Descriptive statistics. Table 2 shows key summary statistics on firms during the four subperi-
ods for which we have firm financial data: 1996–2000, 2000–2004, 2004–2008, and 2008–2012. All
results are weighted by the number of full-time equivalent workers employed by the firm. The
number of firms in the PIA increased by 60 percent between the first and the last period. The aver-
age log firm size increased by 28 log points and average log real value added per worker grew by
15 log points. There is significant dispersion in both log firm size and log value added per worker
across firms, with the standard deviation of the former being close to two and that of the latter
exceeding one. Furthermore, there is no evidence of convergence in either measure: the standard
deviation of firm size monotonically increases whereas the standard deviation of value added per
worker first increases rapidly, then falls again in the last subperiod.
workers, the full-time equivalent workers, measurable human capital-augmented (i.e. accounting for education and
age) workers, and also adjusting for unobserved worker characteristics captured by the worker fixed effect in pay.
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4 Inequality trends in Brazil from 1988–2012
In this section, we provide a first overview of Brazil’s rapid decrease in earnings inequality us-
ing our sample of prime age males.15 We demonstrate that the decrease in inequality in Brazil
occurred throughout a large part of the earnings distribution. Subsequently, we provide some
suggestive evidence of firms being an important source of inequality as well as a factor behind the
decrease in inequality in Brazil.
4.1 The evolution of earnings inequality
Starting from high initial levels, Brazil experienced a rapid and steady fall in earnings inequality
from the mid 1990s onwards. The decrease followed years of stable or slightly increasing inequal-
ity between the late 1980s and the mid-1990s. To illustrate this, Figure 1 plots the variance of
log earnings over the 1988–2012 period in the RAIS. Between 1996 and 2012, the variance of log
earnings in Brazil decreased by 28 log points or 39 percent, from 0.73 to 0.44. To put this decrease
into context, the US saw an increase in the variance of log annual earnings of 30 log points from
1967–2005 (Heathcote et al., 2010).
Figure 1. Variance of log earnings in Brazil, 1988–2012
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To depict the comprehensive nature of the decrease in inequality, Figure 2 plots the log per-
15For clarity and consistency with our main estimation results, we present these trends using the sample of males
aged 18–49 only. The trends described in this section are also present in the overall population.
15
centile ratios of earnings, normalized to zero in 1996.16 Two striking facts emerge: First, the com-
pression was wide-spread throughout the earning distribution, reaching as high as the 75th per-
centile. Second, the amount of compression gradually decreases as one moves further up in the
distribution. For instance, whereas the log 90–50 percentile ratio falls by 26 log points from 1996
to 2012, the log 50–10 ratio decreases by 38 log points, and the log 50–5 ratio by a remarkable 53
log points. We see less compression above the 75th percentile, and some divergence among the
top 10 percent of the earnings distribution, with the log 95–50 percentile ratio falling slightly less
than the log 90–50 ratio.
Figure 2. Log percentile ratios of the earnings distribution in Brazil, normalized to 0 in 1996
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Note: Statistics computed for males of age 18–49. See text for details. Source: RAIS.
Importantly, the inequality decrease was not driven by the rapid educational attainment ex-
pansion and demographic changes during this period. Appendix A shows within aMincer frame-
work that most of the decrease is in fact orthogonal to worker observables. The weak explanatory
power from this worker-side analysis, along with recent evidence of firm-driven inequality trends
in developed economies, motivate us to study the role of firms in the Brazilian labor market.
4.2 Earnings dispersion between and within firms
For a long time, economists have recognized that worker observables fail to explain a large frac-
tion of the variance of earnings (Mincer, 1974; Heckman et al., 2003). A recent literature instead
highlights the role played by firms in giving rise to differences in pay. As a first step towards
16Appendix B shows that there was wide-spread real earnings growth over this period.
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understanding the role of firms in the inequality decrease, we investigate the variance of earnings
within and between firms. To this end, let yijt denote log earnings of worker i employed by firm j
in year t, and y¯jt denote average log earnings in firm j in year t. Following Fortin et al. (2011) and
Song et al. (2016) we can write17
Var
 
yijt
 | {z }
overall
= Var
⇣
y jt
⌘
| {z }
between firms
+Var
⇣
yijt
    i 2 j⌘| {z }
within firms
That is, variance in overall earnings can be decomposed into the variance of average log earnings
at the firm across firms (weighted by worker-years) and the variance of the difference between
workers’ log earnings and the average log earnings at their firm.
Based on these definitions, one could imagine two hypothetical polar extremes. First, aver-
age earnings could be identical across firms so that overall earnings inequality is completely due
to variance in earnings within firms. In this case, a firm is just a microcosm of the overall econ-
omy. Second, all workers could receive the same earnings within the firm so that inequality arises
entirely due to differences in earnings across firms. In reality, the question is which channel is
quantitatively most important.
Figure 3 plots the decomposition of these channels over time in Brazil. We note two insights:
Firstly, there is significant variability in earnings within firms, but an even greater amount of
earnings inequality between firms.18 Secondly, although both measures of inequality fell during
this time, the decrease was particularly pronounced between firms. Inequality between firms
decreased by 18 log points or 42 percent from 1988–2012, whereas within-firm inequality dropped
by 11 log points or 36 percent.19
The decrease in between-firm inequality is not due to a compression of differences between
17To derive this expression, first use the identity
yijt = yt|{z}
economy average
+
⇣
y jt   yt
⌘
| {z }
employer deviation
+
⇣
yijt   y jt
⌘
| {z }
worker deviation
Taking variances on both sides, we get
Var
⇣
yijt   yt
⌘
= Var
⇣
y jt   yt
⌘
+Var
⇣
yijt   y jt
⌘
+ 2Cov
⇣
y jt   yt, yijt   y jt
⌘
| {z }
=0
where the last term is zero by construction. Simplifying, we arrive at the decomposition in the text.
18In contrast, Song et al. (2016) document larger within relative to across firm dispersion. As will become clear later,
this difference is driven by three factors. First, dispersion in the firm component of pay play a relatively larger role in
Brazil (at least in the first periods). Second, we estimate a higher degree of assortative matching between workers and
17
Figure 3. Variance of log earnings between and within firms
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Note: Statistics computed for males of age 18–49. See text for details. Source: RAIS.
sectors. In fact, large between-firm pay compressions occurred in all Brazilian sectors except gov-
ernment, as shown in Figure 4. Moreover, Appendix C shows similar patterns obtain in every
region of Brazil, among small and large firms, and among unproductive and productive firms—
though less so at the most productive firms. Overall, the robustness of the pattern to different cuts
of the data suggests that the importance of between-firm differences in explaining the inequality
decrease is not due to composition along observable dimensions.
Although informative, these type of decompositions of raw earnings cannot necessarily be in-
terpreted as firms differing fundamentally in the way they compensate their workers. The reason
is that some firms could hire workers who always get paid more regardless of where they work
(maybe because they are more productive, have a higher bargaining power, etc). In this case, dif-
ferences in pay across firms would arise as a result of recruitment policies and not pay policies.
With this in mind, the next section identifies the importance of firm pay policies using the panel
dimension of the data.
firms than in the US Finally, the remainder is due to a higher degree of segregation in Brazilian labor markets.
19 Another way of illustrating the importance of firms is to compare earnings growth of different workers with aver-
age earnings growth at their employers. Appendix B conducts this exercise and shows how the decrease in between-
firm differences was driven by a catch-up of average firm earnings among the lowest earnings groups.
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Figure 4. Variance between and within firms, by sector
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Note: Statistics computed for males of age 18–49. See text for details. Source: RAIS.
5 Empirical framework
The evidence in the previous section suggests that firms might be an important determinant of
earnings in Brazil. Motivated by these insights, we estimate high-dimensional fixed effects econo-
19
metric models controlling for both unobserved worker and firm heterogeneity. To be able to speak
to changes over time in the components of inequality, we estimate our model separately in six
subperiods covering 1988–1992, 1992–1996, 1996–2000, 2000–2004, 2004–2008, and 2008–2012, re-
spectively.20 Subsequently, we correlate the estimated firm andworker effects with observed char-
acteristics of firms and workers in order to investigate what may have caused changes in the firm
and worker component of pay over time.
5.1 Worker and firm fixed effects model
In order to separately identify the contribution of individual and firm components in pay, one
needs to observe a panel of workers linked to their employers. The RAIS, our linked employer-
employee data from Brazil, satisfy these requirements. Within subperiods that we set to be five
years in length, we observe a number I of workers working at J firms for a total of N worker-
years. Let J (i, t) denote the employer of worker i in year t (as we uniquely defined in Section 3).
We assume that log earnings of individual i in year t, denoed yit, consist of the sum of a worker
component, ai, a firm component, aJ(i,t), a year effect, Ut, and an error component, # it, so we can
write,21
log yit = ai + aJ(i,t) + Ut + # it
where we assume that the error satisfies the strict exogeneity condition
E
h
# it|ai, aJ(i,t),Ut
i
= 0
Our specification does not control in this first stage for observable worker and firm character-
istics. Instead, we correlate estimated fixed effects with worker and firm observables in a second
stage of our analysis. We prefer this specification to avoid identifying the time-varying effects
off changes within workers and firms during the limited time frame of each subperiod.22 Fur-
thermore, we find this two-stage approach helpful in terms of understanding what the firm and
worker effects may ultimately be standing for.23
20In Appendix D we show that similar results obtain in longer, nine-year subperiods.
21Although our current paper does notmodel the underlying, fundamental sources of this reduced form specification,
in subsequent work we show how it can be rationalized in a frictional labor market with firm productive heterogeneity
and worker ability differences (Engbom and Moser, 2017a).
22Including age effects in the above framework with individual and year effects would require a normalization, as
for instance the restriction advocated by Deaton (1997).
23In this sense, our approach is reminiscent of that of Bertrand and Schoar (2003) in their study of the determinants
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Table 3. Frequency of switches, by period
# Unique workers Average # of jobs % switchers
1988–1992 23.1 1.56 0.37
1992–1996 23.7 1.48 0.33
1996–2000 25.6 1.45 0.32
2000–2004 28.8 1.46 0.32
2004–2008 33.0 1.54 0.36
2008–2012 38.6 1.66 0.42
Note: Number of unique workers in millions. A switcher is defined as a worker who is associated with two or more employers during
the period. Source: RAIS.
As shown by AKM, worker and firm effects can only be separately identified within a set of
firms and workers connected through the mobility of workers. Table 13 in Appendix F presents
summary statistics on the largest set of connected workers in each subperiod—this covers 97–98
percent of all workers in each subperiod. Given the high coverage, it is not surprising that the
restricted subpopulation looks very similar to the overall population. Thus the restriction to the
largest connected set seems relatively innocuous.
As identification of the model derives from workers switching between firms, Table 3 presents
statistics on the fraction of switchers in each subperiod. The degree of labor mobility is high in
Brazil, withmore than 30 percent of the population switching firms at some point during each five-
year subperiod. The average number of firms worked at during the five years in each subperiod
is about 1.5. There is no strong trend in either statistic.
The assumption on the error term is referred to in the literature as that of requiring exogenous
mobility. As explained by AKM, this rules out mobility based on the unobserved error component.
Following Card et al. (2013), we investigate the validity of this assumption in several ways. We
divide estimated firm effects into quartiles and study whether the gain in the firm component of
those switching between for instance the first and fourth quartile is similar to the loss of those
making the reverse switch. To the extent that match effects are an important determinant of earn-
ings and mobility, we would expect all workers to make gains from switching. Furthermore, we
examine the distribution of the average residual across worker and firm effects to check for any
systematic deviation from zero (which could indicate that the log linear model is misspecified).
Let ai denote the estimated worker effect, aJ(i,t) the estimated firm effect, Yt the estimated year
effect, and eit the residual. Based on our estimated equation, we decompose the variance of log
of CEO pay.
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earnings within any subperiod into the variance of the worker component, the firm component,
and the year trend, as well as the covariance between the worker and the firm component, the
worker and year component, the firm and year component, and the variance of the residual:
Var (log yit) = Var (ai) +Var
⇣
aJ(i,t)
⌘
+Var (Yt) + 2Cov
⇣
ai, aJ(i,t)
⌘
+2Cov (ai,Yt) + 2Cov
⇣
aJ(i,t),Yt
⌘
+Var (eit) (1)
Note that sampling error in the estimated effects will cause us to overestimate the variance of
worker and firm effects, and in general induce a negative bias in the covariance between worker
and firm effects (see for instance Andrews et al., 2008). Following Card et al. (2013), we do not
attempt to correct for this, but instead assume that this error is constant over time, so that even if
the level of our estimated variances is slightly overstated, the changes we document over time are
still valid.24
5.2 Determinants of the estimated firm effects
In the second stage of our empirical investigation, we study how the estimated firm effects relate
to observable measures of firm performance available in the PIA survey. In particular, we are
interested in understanding what firm characteristics are related to pay, and whether changes in
the distribution of firm effects over time can be explained by underlying changes in firm charac-
teristics or the way the labor market translates those into pay. Since the PIA only covers larger
manufacturing and mining firms,25 we are forced to restrict attention to only these firms and
workers when linking firm effects to firm characteristics. We implement this by first estimating
the AKM model for the universe of firms and workers, and subsequently restricting attention to
only larger manufacturing firms.
Let Xj denote a vector of firm characteristics—for each subperiod we regress by OLS
aj = Xjb+ hj
24To better estimate firm effects, Bonhomme et al. (2016) suggest restricting attention to firms whose fixed effect is
“well-identified” due to a high number of switchers. In practice, this procedure boils down to restricting attention to
workers at firms with at least 10 switchers during the estimation period. Implementing this restriction, we get similar
results as those reported below.
25As described in Section 3, we restrict attention to the deterministic stratum of PIA containing only larger firms. We
drop small firms contained in the random stratum to ensure that firms stay in the sample for multiple years for our
estimation procedure below.
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All regressions are weighted by worker-years. We consider versions including average log value
added per worker during the subperiod, average log firm size during the subperiod, state fixed
effects, and two-digit subsector fixed effects. Additionally, we have considered versions including
a range of other firm characteristics as well as higher order terms, but these add only marginally
to the explanatory power of the regressions so in the interest of space we do not show them.
Based on the above regression, we compute the variance in firm effects explained by firm
observables as
Var (aˆ) = b0Var(X)b
where b is the estimated coefficient vector and X is the designmatrix. In order to isolate the impor-
tance of a compression in firm fundamentals versus a compression in the pass-through from such
fundamentals to pay, we consider two counterfactuals. First, we assume that the pass-through
from firm characteristics to pay, b, remains at its initial level, while the distribution of firm char-
acteristics, Var(X), changes over time. Second, we assume that Var(X) stays the same while b
changes as in the data. A comparison of the two counterfactuals allows us to address whether a
change in the variance of firm pay is explained by changes in underlying firm characteristics or
due to a change in the degree of pass-through from such characteristics to worker pay.
5.3 Determinants of the estimated worker effects
We also investigate what factors influence the worker component of pay. To this end, we proceed
in a similar fashion as for firms and regress the predicted worker effects on a vector of worker
observables,Wi:
ai = Wiz + hi
All regressions are weighted by worker-years. We include in Wi a constant, a worker’s age bin,
four education dummies, and state fixed effects (the former two computed as the modal value
during the subperiod). We have also considered versions of this regressionwith age and education
interacted as well as including occupation or sector controls, but as neither of these alternatives
changes the estimated results meaningfully we do not report the results.
Based on this regression, we predict the variance explained by worker observables as
Var (aˆ) = z0Var(W)z
23
where z is the estimated coefficient vector and W is the design matrix. Subsequently, we de-
compose the evolution of the variance of the explained part of the worker effect into that due to a
change in the underlying distribution of such characteristics versus a change in the return to them.
That is, we first keep the estimated return to the characteristic of interest constant and change only
the underlying distribution to match its evolution in the data. This shows how important changes
in the distribution of worker characteristics were for the overall inequality decrease. Secondly,
we instead change the return to the characteristic of interest as in the data, while holding the un-
derlying distribution constant. This evaluates how important changes in the returns to age and
education were for the overall inequality decrease.
6 Results
In this section, we first present results from our first-stage two-way fixed effects model, decom-
posing earnings inequality into a firm and a worker component. Subsequently, we investigate the
sources of the firm and worker component of pay. Finally, we provide additional results evaluat-
ing the assumptions imposed by our econometric model.
6.1 AKM decomposition
Table 4 presents the variance decomposition based on the estimation results of the AKM model
in equation (1) for each of the six five-year subperiods between 1988 and 2012.26 To illustrate the
relative importance of the various components of this decomposition over time, Figure 5 plots
the variance of raw earnings (solid blue line with circles), the variance of estimated worker ef-
fects (dashed red line with squares), and the variance of firm effects (dash-dotted green line with
diamonds). The variance of year effects and covariance terms are small in magnitude and play
an insignificant role in the overall inequality decrease. These terms are excluded for brevity. All
results are weighted by worker-years.
Two important results emerge from our analysis. First, worker heterogeneity is the single
most important determinant of earnings inequality. In the 1996–2000 subperiod, the variance of
worker fixed effects makes up 49 percent of the total variance of log earnings. This increases
monotonically to 58 percent by the last subperiod. The variance of firm effects makes up 24 percent
26Appendix D shows that similar results are obtained using three longer, nine-year subperiods.
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Table 4. AKM estimation results, by period
1988–1992 1992–1996 1996–2000 2000–2004 2004–2008 2008–2012 Change 1996–2012
Variance of log earnings 0.75 (100.0%) 0.75 (100.0%) 0.69 (100.0%) 0.62 (100.0%) 0.53 (100.0%) 0.47 (100.0%) -0.23 (100.0%)
Variance of worker effects 0.38 (50.8%) 0.37 (48.9%) 0.34 (48.8%) 0.33 (52.6%) 0.30 (56.4%) 0.27 (58.4%) -0.07 (29.0%)
Variance of firm effects 0.16 (21.1%) 0.17 (23.3%) 0.16 (23.7%) 0.13 (20.4%) 0.09 (17.4%) 0.07 (16.0%) -0.09 (39.6%)
Variance of year effects 0.02 (2.2%) 0.01 (2.0%) 0.00 (0.1%) 0.00 (0.1%) 0.00 (0.1%) 0.00 (0.3%) 0.00 (-0.3%)
2⇥Cov. worker and firm effects 0.13 (17.3%) 0.14 (18.6%) 0.14 (20.0%) 0.12 (18.8%) 0.10 (18.6%) 0.09 (18.4%) -0.05 (23.2%)
2⇥Cov. worker and year effects -0.01 (-1.2%) -0.01 (-1.6%) 0.00 (-0.3%) 0.00 (0.2%) 0.00 (0.1%) 0.00 (-0.6%) 0.00 (0.2%)
2⇥Cov. firm and year effects 0.00 (-0.5%) -0.01 (-0.8%) 0.00 (-0.2%) 0.00 (0.1%) 0.00 (0.0%) 0.00 (0.0%) 0.00 (-0.5%)
Variance of residual 0.08 (10.1%) 0.07 (9.7%) 0.06 (7.9%) 0.05 (7.8%) 0.04 (7.4%) 0.04 (7.6%) -0.02 (8.7%)
# worker years 77.3 77.3 81.5 91.8 110.0 132.2
# firms 0.96 1.02 1.21 1.41 1.71 2.16
R2 0.90 0.90 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.92
Note: Variance decomposition is Var (yit) = Var (ai) +Var
⇣
aj
⌘
+Var (Yt) +Var (eit) + 2Cov (ai,Yt) + 2Cov
⇣
aj,Yt
⌘
+ 2Cov
⇣
aj,Yt
⌘
. Cells
contain the variance explained by each decomposition element. The share of the total variance explained by each decomposition element is given
in parentheses. Weighted by worker-years. Source: RAIS.
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of the variance of log earnings in the 1996–2000 subperiod, decreasing to 16 percent by the last
subperiod. Finally, the covariance between the worker and firm effects consistently explains just
under 20 percent of the overall variance.
Figure 5. Variance decomposition from AKMmodel
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Second, in terms of explaining time trends, we observe a more than proportionate fall in the
variance of firm effects. Between 1996–2000 and 2008–2012, the variance of firm effects falls from
16 to seven log points whereas the variance of person effects falls from 34 to 27 log points. The
correlation between worker and firm effects stays fairly constant at around 0.3 throughout the
period, and hence the covariance term falls in line with the standard deviations of the worker and
firm effects. Given the large role played by firms in the inequality decrease, understanding the
drivers of more equal pay across employers over time is an important question which we address
in the following section.
6.2 The link between firm effects and firm characteristics
When studying the link between firm effects and firm characteristics, we limit attention to the
manufacturing and mining sector, for which we have data on firm performance and characteris-
tics. Table 5 compares AKM estimates for this subpopulation with the estimates for the overall
population. As noted earlier, we impose the restriction to the PIA subpopulation after estimating
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the AKMmodel on the entire population of adult males. This group includes a small percentage of
firms in the overall economy (2.6–2.9 percent), but covers 18–19 percent of employment given the
larger size of firms in the manufacturing and mining sectors. The overall variance of log earnings
is five log points higher in the PIA subpopulation during the 1996–2000 subperiod and falls by 22
log points until the 2008–2012 subperiod, compared to 23 log points in the overall population. The
variance of worker effects is three log points higher in the 1996–2000 subperiod and falls by two
log point less. The variance of firm effects is two log points less in 1996–2000 and falls by one log
point less. We conclude that inequality trends are similar in the PIA subpopulation compared to
the overall population.
Why do some firms pay more than others, and what makes firms offer more equal pay over
time? Table 6 reports results from regressing estimated firm effects on average log value added per
worker and average log firm size by subperiod, either with or without subsector or state controls.
All regressions are weighted by worker-years. Several features are worth highlighting. First, more
productive and larger firms pay significantly more after controlling for sorting of workers. Our
estimates suggest that a one log point more productive firm pays a given worker 0.26 log points
more, or alternatively that a one standard deviation more productive firm pays over 30 percent
more to a given worker. Furthermore, we find that essentially the entire return to working at a
larger firm is due to a strong positive correlation between firm size and productivity—controlling
for value added per worker a larger firm pays only marginally better.
Second, the amount of dispersion in firm effects explained by firm productivity is notable.
Only a linear term in average log value added per worker explains around half of the variation in
the firm component of pay, despite the fact that sampling error in the estimated firm effects will
lead us to understate the importance of productivity for pay. Adding also controls for subsector,
the R2 is over 0.6.
Third, the pass-through from firm performance to the firm component of pay falls substantially
between 1996–2000 and 2008–2012. As noted above, in the first subperiod a one log point more
productive firm paid 0.26 log points more—by the last subperiod this pass-through has almost
halved to 0.14. Given that the standard deviation of value added per worker remained roughly
constant at just above one over this period, the variation in pay attributable to variation in firm
productivity fell substantially. On the contrary, although both subsectors and states explain a
non-trivial amount of the level of inequality in firm pay, compression across states or subsectors
29
explains little of the declining dispersion in firm pay.
Figure 6 illustrates the relationship by plotting by period the average estimated AKM firm ef-
fects against 90 quantile bins of value added per worker. Over most of its support, the relationship
is approximately linear, and it displays a clear flattening over time.
Figure 6. Estimated AKM firm effects versus value added per worker, by period
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Note: Statistics computed for males of age 18–49. See text for details. Source: RAIS and PIA.
To illustrate the importance of the fall in the pass-through for the overall inequality decrease,
Figure 7 plots the variance of firm effects (solid blue linewith circles), the predicted variance due to
value added per worker and subsector controls (dashed red line with squares), and the predicted
variance due to only changing the passthrough from productivity to pay (dash-dotted green line
with diamonds). Between 1996–2000 and 2008–2012, the variance explained by observable firm
characteristics decreases by six log points, or roughly 30 percent of the overall decrease in the
variance of log earnings over this period. All of this is driven by changes in the pass-through.
One possibility is that the pass-through from value added per worker to pay differs system-
atically by size of firm, and that changes in the firm size distribution over time has led to a fall
in the measured pass-through. Table 7 investigates this by pooling all subperiods and including
a time invariant interaction between value added per worker and firm size, in addition to period
effects and period specific pass-throughs from value added per worker and firm size to pay. The
estimated fall in pass-through from value added per worker to pay is comparable to our previous
30
estimation results, confirming that the decrease has taken place conditional on firm size.27 Figure
8 illustrates this by plotting the relationship between estimated AKM firm effects and value added
per worker separately by firm size quartiles over time.
Figure 7. Variance of firm effects, variance explained by value added per worker, and
counterfactual variance with constant returns
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6.3 The link between worker effects and worker characteristics
We finally turn to our results regarding the link between observable worker characteristics and
the worker component of pay. Table 8 shows estimates from regressing the estimated worker ef-
fects on age and education, with or without state controls. We note the following: First, more
able workers, as measured by labor market experience or education level, are paid more. For in-
stance, the oldest age group earns 44–54 log points more than the youngest age group conditional
on place of work, and a college graduate earns more than twice the amount of the lowest educa-
tion group. Observable worker characteristics jointly explain 37–42 percent of the variance in the
worker component of pay, with most of the dispersion being observed within states.
Second, both the age gradient and the return to education decrease over time. Workers aged
40–49 experienced a decrease in pay relative to those aged 18–24 of eight log points (or 15 percent)
27Appendix E investigates whether opening up to trade may have mechanically reduced the pass-through by sep-
arately considering exporters and non-exporters, and finds that both groups have experienced a similar fall in the
pass-through as the overall economy.
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Table 7. Results from regression of estimated firm effects on firm characteristics controlling
for differential pass-through by firm size
Baseline State Sector
Value added p.w.
1996–2000 0.158 0.139 0.142
2000–2004 0.124 0.116 0.106
2004–2008 0.082 0.075 0.062
2008–2012 0.058 0.053 0.040
Firm size
1996–2000 -0.105 -0.063 -0.078
2000–2004 -0.133 -0.092 -0.100
2004–2008 -0.134 -0.092 -0.099
2008–2012 -0.130 -0.089 -0.096
Value added p.w. x Firm size 0.012 0.009 0.010
Subsector controls No No Yes
State controls No Yes No
Worker-years 77.1 77.1 77.1
R2 0.553 0.627 0.648
Note: Dependent variable is the estimated firm effect aj. All specifications include period effects. Number of worker-years in millions.
Weighted by worker-years. Source: RAIS and PIA.
between 1996–2000 and 2008–2012. Over the same time period, middle school, high-school and
college graduates saw decreases of five, 19 and nine log points, respectively, relative to those with
only primary school. Figure 9 illustrates these results by plotting the overall variance of worker
effects (solid blue line with circles), the predicted variance due to age and education (dashed red
line with squares), the counterfactual variance explained by changes only in the returns (dash-
dotted green line with diamonds), and the counterfactual variance explained by changes only in
the distribution. We find that education and age account for roughly 50 percent of the decline in
dispersion in the worker component, and this is all due to a change in returns.28
6.4 Support for the AKMmodel
A large part of our analysis has been based on estimation results from repeated applications of
the AKM framework. Although the consistently high R2 of our model suggests that it provides
a good fit to the data, our estimates can be biased if the match effect is correlated with either the
firm or worker component of earnings. To investigate this possibility further, we replicate two
robustness exercises proposed by Card et al. (2013) using the Brazilian RAIS data.
28Of course, falling returns could result from changes in the distribution. The counterfactual of holding the distribu-
tion constant while changing returns should be interpret with this qualification in mind.
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Figure 8. Estimated AKM firm effects versus value added per worker, by firm size quartile
and period
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Note: Statistics computed for males of age 18–49. See text for details. Source: RAIS and PIA.
First, Figure 10 shows the average earnings of workers who switch firms up to two years prior
to the switch and two years after the switch for the latest subperiod.29 Switchers are classified
by the firm effect quartile of their pre- and post-transition employers. Consistent with the AKM
specification, the gains of those switching up are similar to the losses of those making the reverse
switch.30
Second, Figure 11 shows the average estimated residual by decile of worker and firm effects
for the subperiods 1996–2000 and 2008–2012.31 There is some evidence of misspecification for the
lowest decile of worker effects in the sense that they display a systematically positive residual
while working at the lowest-paying firms, and vice versa for highest-paying firms. Similarly, the
29Similar results hold in other subperiods and across other quartiles.
30Bonhomme et al. (2016) caution that models that do not feature log additivity in earnings may also satisfy this test.
The results of this event study should be interpreted with this qualification in mind.
31Similar results hold in other subperiods.
34
Figure 9. Variance of worker effects, variance explained by age and education, and variance
holding the return to age and education constant
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Figure 10. Average changes in earnings of workers switching employers
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Figure 11. AKM residual by firm and worker fixed effect deciles
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Note: Statistics computed for males of age 18–49. See text for details. Source: RAIS.
lowest firm effects decile shows systematic positive mean residuals for the lowest-paid workers,
and vice versa for the highest-paid workers. However, the magnitude of these errors is modest
and beyond the lowest deciles of worker and firm effects errors do not exhibit a strong systematic
relationship.32
6.5 Potential explanations behind decreasing inequality in Brazil
A key takeaway from our analysis is that changes in the pass-through from worker and firm char-
acteristics to pay was a major driver behind Brazil’s inequality decrease from 1996 to 2012. While
measures of worker ability and firm productivity are positively correlated with pay throughout
this period, it is not the case that Brazil becamemore equal in terms of such fundamentals. Instead
the pass-through from these characteristics to pay collapsed, resulting in a lower worker skill pay
premium and a lower firm productivity pay premium. An important question is what might have
caused this decrease in pass-through.
Although our current paper stops short of providing a complete story behind the fall in pass-
through, we highlight a few explanations that we view as more or less promising based on our
empirical analysis. We first note that an overwhelming majority of the inequality decrease took
place within states and detailed industry classifications. Second, the pass-through from produc-
32Engbom and Moser (2017a) argue that this pattern is consistent with a binding minimum wage.
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tivity to pay fell within firm size groups, for exporters and non-exporters, and for a balanced
panel of surviving firms. Based on these observations, we believe that a convincing explanation
goes beyond the direct effect of compositional changes.
Consistent with our empirical findings, we briefly discuss three promising explanations be-
hind Brazil’s inequality decrease. First, there was a rapid expansion in educational attainment
over this period. By increasing the labor supply of higher education groups, this may have con-
tributed towards falling education premiums. It would be interesting to quantify this channel
through an equilibrium model estimated to the microdata. However, it is worth stressing that
most of Brazil’s inequality decrease was due to forces on the firm side. It is less clear to us why
changes in the market for education would affect firm-specific pay components.
Second, changes in bargaining between employers and employees over firm-specific surplus
may directly speak to the declining dispersion in firm-level pay. Higher baseline pay and lower de-
pendence on firm-specific (worker-specific) performance could plausibly explain our documented
facts on rising real earnings and a lower pass-through from firm productivity (worker ability) to
pay. Specifically, although unions have held a strong role in Brazil throughout this period, to the
extent that the bargaining process became more centralized over this period, this may have made
earnings less dependent on firm-specific performance andmore on regional, industry or aggregate
negotiation outcomes. Using detailed data on union bargaining agreements to study this further
would be an interesting avenue for future research.
Third, Brazil’s federal minimum wage rose by 119 percent in real terms from 1996 to 2012.
Given that this legislation cuts across sectors and states, we view it as a promising candidate for
explaining the decrease of inequality in Brazil over this period. Consistent with our finding that
the inequality decrease is primarily due to changes in the returns to worker and firm character-
istics, the minimum wage may plausibly affect the way that firm-specific surplus is split without
directly affecting the distribution of worker and firm characteristics. A challenge for this story,
however, is to explain why inequality fell throughout large parts of the earnings distribution. In
Engbom and Moser (2017a), we pursue this idea further by developing an equilibrium search
model and estimating spillover effects of the minimum wage.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, we used detailed linked employer-employee dissect the evolution of inequality in
Brazil between 1988 and 2012. After increasing moderately between 1988–1996, the variance of log
labor earnings decreased by 28 log points between 1996–2012. To understand the sources of this
decrease, we estimate high-dimensional fixed effects models of earnings controlling for worker
and firm heterogeneity. Our results suggest that firms contributed more than proportionately to
the decrease.
While more productive firms pay more, compression in firm productivity was not a factor
behind declining inequality. Instead, we find that a declining pass-through from firm productivity
to pay played an important role behind the decrease. On the worker side, higher ability workers
as measured by educational attainment or experience are paid more, yet such measures of worker
ability show no compression over time. Rather, a significant share of the explained decrease in
worker heterogeneity is due to rapidly falling returns to such measures of worker ability. We
conclude that changes in pay policies, rather than changes in firm and worker fundamentals,
played a significant role in Brazil’s inequality decrease.
Our findings propose a set of facts that any potential theory of the inequality decrease in Brazil
should be consistent with. Such a theorymust generate pay differences between firms for identical
workers that are strongly positively correlated with firm productivity. Moreover, any promising
explanation needs to generate a compression in firm pay differences over time not through com-
pression in the distribution of firm productivity, but through a weaker link between productivity
and pay. On the worker side, it should generate compression primarily through declining returns
to ability and not through compression in the underlying ability distribution.
We think that promising candidates behind the decrease in inequality in Brazil are changes in
the nature of wage setting. In follow-upwork (Engbom andMoser, 2017a), we argue that the rapid
rise in the minimumwage in Brazil during this period has had large effects on earnings inequality,
while being consistent with the stylized facts presented in this paper. Our work suggests that
investigating other labor market institutions represents a promising avenue for future research in
the context of earnings inequality dynamics in Brazil and potentially elsewhere.
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Appendix
A Mincer regressions
This section studies changes in worker observables and their returns within a Mincer framework.
In contrast to a popularly held belief, Brazil’s inequality decline was not driven by worker observ-
ables and the rapid increase in educational attainment that took place during this period.
Building on the classical framework by Mincer (1974), we regress log monthly real earnings
on worker observables. Specifically, we include five age group dummies interacted with nine
education group dummies, one digit occupation dummies and two digit sector dummies,
log (yit) = ageit ⇥ eduit + occit + secit + # it
Note that all explanatory variables are allowed to vary freely by year. Based on this regression, we
calculate the predicted value due to each component and report the variance of these predicted
values.
Figure 12 plots the results. We draw two conclusions: First, worker observables jointly explain
about 45 percent of the overall variance in log earnings. In contrast, our AKM methodology in
Section 5 suggests that worker observables explain 37–40 percent of the variance of the worker com-
ponent of earnings (which constitutes 50–60 percent of the overall variance). Partly, the difference
can be explained by the fact that we let observables as well as their returns vary by year in the
Mincer framework while the AKM framework uses averages over the subperiod. Conceptually
more important, the discrepancy suggests that part of the return to education and experience is
due to a selection into better paying firms.
Second, the fraction of earnings dispersion explained by worker observables does not change
much over time. Hence, worker observables and sector controls explain close to 23 percent of
the fall in inequality. Decomposing this, age and education account for roughly 20 percent of the
variance of log earnings and six percent of the decline. Inequality between occupations remains
relatively constant around six to eight percent of total variance. The fraction of total inequality
explained by differences in means across sectors falls from seven to three percent—this accounts
for 15 percent of the overall decline in variance. Finally, covariances between the explanatory
variables remain stable around 12–14 of total variance. We conclude that even when controlling
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for detailed worker characteristics, more than half of the level of inequality as well as its decline
is residual in nature.
Figure 12. Variance decomposition from Mincer regressions
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Note: Statistics computed for males of age 18–49. See text for details. Source: RAIS.
How do these results square with the common claim that a rapid increase in educational at-
tainment contributed towards Brazil’s inequality decline? To this end, it is important to note that
while the Brazilian workforce saw a steep rise in high school (college) attainment from 16 (eight)
percent in 1996 to 49 (ten) percent in 2012, this shift was offset by a concurrent reduction in the
high school (college) premium relative to less than middle school from 0.72 (1.32) log points in
1996 to 0.22 (1.23) log points by 2012. Hence the push towards higher educational levels, par-
ticularly among initially lowest education groups, was largely offset by a decline in the returns
to education. This story is consistent with our findings of a lower gradient of worker effects in
worker observables, including education, which we highlight in Section 6.
B Earnings growth and firm average earnings growth by initial earn-
ings percentiles
Following Barth et al. (2016) and Song et al. (2016), we make use of the linked employer-employee
nature of the RAIS data to quantify to what extent earnings growth across income groups was
mediated by changes in average pay at firms employing workers from that income group. The
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results of this exercise are shown in Figure 13 for the period 1988–1996, when inequality increased
mildly, and for the period 1996–2012, when earnings inequality declined rapidly.
Figure 13. Individual real labor earnings growth between and within firms
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Note: Statistics computed for males of age 18–49. See text for details. Source: RAIS.
There are three features worth noting. First, real labor earnings growth occurred at almost
every percentile of the distribution throughout both periods. Second, individual earnings growth
(solid blue line with circles) slopes mildly upward in initial earnings percentiles from 1988–1996
and pronouncedly slopes downward from 1996–2012, indicating that earnings inequality increased
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a little during the first period and decreased significantly during the second period. Third, indi-
vidual earnings growth throughout the distribution is almost entirely explained by the growth of
firm average earnings (dashed red linewith squares) among those groups. Remarkably, there were
no significant changes in within-firm earnings inequality (dash-dotted green line with diamonds).
We interpret these results as suggestive evidence in favor of firms playing an important role
in explaining earnings inequality dynamics during the period of increasing inequality from 1988–
1996 and also during the large decrease in inequality from 1996–2012.
C Variance between and within firms by region, firm size and produc-
tivity
We now show that the compression in pay across firmswas not solely driven by a particular subset
of regions or firms, nor was it driven by a compression in average differences between regions or
productivity groups.
Figure 14 plots inequality across and within firms within Brazilian regions. Although there are
differences in levels, all regions display substantial compression of pay over time. Moreover, the
dominance of between-firm compression is present in every region.
Similarly, Figures 15 and 16 plot the same decomposition of inequality between and within
firms by size of the firm and by productivity of the firm, respectively. We observe a similar pattern
of substantial compression across firms within small, medium and large firms, as well as within
low-productivity and medium-productivity firms. The decline is less pronounced among high
productivity firms.
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Figure 14. Variance between and within firms within Brazilian regions.
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Figure 15. Variance between and within firms, by firm size terciles
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Figure 16. Variance between and within firms, by productivity terciles
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D Robustness of AKM results
The following section presents additional robustness results to our first-stage AKM regressions.
First, we show that similar results are obtained in longer, nine-year subperiods instead of our
baseline five-year subperiods. Second, we present results for the last four subperiods using hourly
wages.
D.1 Longer subperiods
Table 9 shows results for nine-year subperiods 1988–1996, 1996–2004, and 2004–2012. As expected,
worker effects explain a few percentage points less of the overall variation in earnings, which is
offset by a larger variance of the residual. The share contributed by firm effects remains roughly
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the same. Our main conclusion that worker effects explain most of the level of inequality while
firm effects explain a disproportionate share of the decline continues to hold.
Table 9. AKM robustness results, longer subperiods
1988–1996 1996–2004 2004–2012 Change 1996–2012
Variance of log earnings 0.77 (100.0%) 0.70 (100.0%) 0.54 (100.0%) -0.23 (100.0%)
Variance of worker effects 0.35 (45.9%) 0.32 (46.0%) 0.29 (53.6%) -0.06 (27.6%)
Variance of firm effects 0.170 (21.9%) 0.15 (21.7%) 0.09 (16.3%) -0.08 (35.3%)
Variance of year effects 0.03 (3.3%) 0.00 (0.2%) 0.00 (0.2%) -0.03 (10.9%)
2⇥Cov. worker and firm 0.15 (19.7%) 0.15 (21.2%) 0.11 (20.5%) -0.04 (17.7%)
2⇥Cov. worker and year -0.02 (-2.3%) 0.00 (0.5%) 0.00 (-0.2%) 0.02 (-7.3%)
2⇥Cov. firm and year -0.01 (-1.4%) 0.00 (0.3%) 0.00 (0.0%) 0.01 (-4.6%)
Variance of residual 0.10 (12.8%) 0.07 (10.3%) 0.05 (9.6%) -0.05 (20.6%)
# worker-years 155.6 175.9 249.4
# firms 1.45 1.93 2.80
R2 0.87 0.90 0.90
Note: Variance decomposition is Var (yit) = Var (ai) + Var
 
aj
 
+ Var (Yt) + Var (eit) + 2Cov (ai ,Yt) + 2Cov
 
aj,Yt
 
+ 2Cov
 
aj,Yt
 
.
Cells contain variance explained by each decomposition element. The share of the total variance explained by each decomposition
element given in parentheses. Weighted by worker-years. Source: RAIS.
D.2 Hourly wages
Our data do not contain information on hours prior to 1994, but we do have data on contracted
weekly hours after that year. We find relatively small variation in contracted hours for prime age
males, with the top 75 percent of the distribution reporting working 44 hours a week (conditional
on working). To further verify the robustness of our results to variation in labor supply, Table 10
shows results from our first stage regression for the last four subperiods using hourly wages.
Inequality in hourly wages falls by four log points more than inequality in monthly income.
This is primarily accounted for by a larger fall in the variance of the worker component of pay,
while the fall in the firm component is in line with our earlier findings. Yet, our main conclusion
that a compression in the firm component of pay contributed the most to the overall fall remains.
E Robustness of the relationship between productivity and pay
The following section presents additional robustness results related to our second-stage regres-
sions of firm effects on productivity. First, we show results estimated using a balanced panel of
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firms. Second, we explore the relationship between exporting status and the firm component of
pay.
E.1 Regressions of firm effects on firm observables in a balanced panel
We repeat our second-stage estimation for a balanced panel of firms who are present in the PIA
data in all four periods from 1996 to 2012. Estimating the second stage on only surviving firms
sheds light on the role of exit and entry versus changes in pay within surviving firms. We find that
the results using a balanced panel are in line with those previously presented in Table 6. There is
a slightly steeper relationship between value added per worker and firm effects in the balanced
panel, with a similar decline in the magnitude of the coefficient over time across all specifications.
E.2 Relationship between firm effects, productivity, and exporter status
Table 12 shows the results of second-stage regressions of firm effects on value added per worker
using an export indicator and export intensity as additional controls.33 All regressions include a
vector of subsector dummies. The positive relationship between value added per worker and firm
effects remains after controlling for exporting variables, and the coefficient declines over time. The
patterns and magnitudes of the productivity-pay relationship are similar to the ones discussed in
section 6.
Moreover, exporting firms pay a higher premium than non-exporting firms, although the pre-
mium among exporting firms decreases with export intensity. The difference between exporting
and non-exporting firms decreases from 13–25 log points to 2–7 log points once we control for dif-
ferences in productivity. Also, the positive relationship between value added per worker and firm
effects is present among exporting and non-exporting firms, and this has flattened among both
groups. Figure 17 depicts these patterns in graphical form. The consistently positive gradient
between value added per worker and firm effects among exporting and non-exporting firms, the
large decline in exporting premiums after controlling for differences in value added per worker,
and the finding that the firm effects gradient in value added per worker declined for both ex-
porters and non-exporters motivate our focus on the firm productivity dimension.
33We define export intensity as revenues from exports divided by total revenues.
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Figure 17. Estimated AKM firm effects versus value added per worker, by exporter status
and period
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F Largest connected set
Table 13 compares workers in the largest connected set to the overall population of adult males.
Given that the largest connected set covers 97–98 percent of the overall population, it is not sur-
prising that the two are very similar.
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